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国际空间武器观点(全文完整)

时间:2022-07-05 08:35:02 来源:网友投稿

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国际空间武器观点(全文完整)

 

 C ont ents

 EXECUTIVE

 SUMMAR Y

  .......................................................................................... IV

 INTR ODUC TION

  ...................................................................................................... 1

 DEFINING

 S P A CE

 W ARFARE

 AND S P A CE

 WEAP ONS

  ......................................... 3

 FR AMEW ORK

 FOR

 EV ALU A TING

 S P A CE

 WEAP ONS

  .......................................... 5

 EXISTING

 INTERN A TIONAL

 A GREEMENTS

  ........................................................ 9

 PR OP OSED

 INTERN A TIONAL

 A GREEMENTS

  ................................................... 12

 RECENT

 A C TIVITIES

 AND S T A TEMENTS

  .......................................................... 17

 C ONCLUSIONS

  ...................................................................................................... 22

 ABOUT

 THE

 AUTHOR

  ........................................................................................... 24

  Executive

 Summary Little

 c onsensus

 e xists

 in

 the

 int ernational

 c ommunity

 on

 what

 c onstitut es

 a spac e

 weapon

 or the

 w eaponization

 o f

 spac e.

 This

 paper

 uses

 a

 broad frame w ork f or what

 may

 be

 c onsidered

 a

 spac e

 w eapon, organiz ed

 by

 the

 domains

 in

 which they

 originat e

 and

 hav e

 eff e cts

 (Ear th-to-spac e,

 spac e-t o-spac e,

 and

 spac e-t o- Ear th) as

 w ell

 as

 the

 physical

 means

 by

 which

 these

 eff e cts

 are achie v ed

 (kinetic and

 non-kinetic).

 While

 there are many

 other ways

 to cat e goriz e

 and

 subdivide the

 broad range

 o f

 possible

 spac e

 w eapons, the

 six

 resulting

 cat e gories

 in

 this frame w ork pro v e

 useful

 f or highlighting

 diff erenc es

 in

 definitions,

 how

 c ountries vie w

 spac e

 w eapons, and

 the

 current

 stat e

 o f

 spac e

 w eaponization.

 Of

 the

 six cat e gories,

 thre e

 cat e gories

 o f

 spac e

 w eapons

 hav e

 be en

 demonstrated

 by nations

 either

 through

 t esting,

 deplo yment ,

 or operational

 use

 (Ear th-to-spac e kinetic,

 Ear th-to-spac e

 non-kinetic,

 and

 spac e-t o-spac e

 kinetic).

 This

 means

 that by

 many

 definitions

 spac e

 has

 already

 be en

 w eaponiz ed.

 No

 int ernational

 agre ements

 e xist

 t oday

 that

 c omplet ely

 limit

 spac e

 w eapons within

 any

 o f

 the

 six

 cat e gories

 o f

 the

 frame w ork.

 Ho we v er ,

 some

 agre ements limit

 c er tain

 types

 o f

 spac e

 w eapons

 that

 are subsets

 within

 the

 cat e gories list ed

 abo v e.

 The

 P ar tial

 T est

 Ban

 T reaty and

 Out er Spac e

 T reaty are the

 major widely

 ac c epted

 int ernational

 agre ements

 that

 limit

 spac e

 w eapons

 activity and

 t esting.

 The

 P ar tial

 T est

 Ban

 T reaty o f

 1963

 prohibits

 the

 t esting

 and

 use o f

 nuclear

 warheads

 on

 Ear th-to-spac e

 and

 spac e-t o-spac e

 kinetic

 weapons.

 It

 does

 not ,

 howe v er ,

 aff e ct

 the

 de v elopment ,

 t esting,

 deplo yment ,

 or use

 o f non-nuclear

 spac e

 weapons.

 Similarly ,

 the

 Out er Spac e

 T reaty o f

 1967

 prohibits nuclear-armed

 spac e-t o-spac e

 and

 spac e-t o-Ear th

 kinetic

 weapons.

 It

 also prohibits

 all

 f orms

 o f

 spac e-t o-spac e

 w eapons

 from being

 t est ed

 and

 used

 in military

 maneuv ers

 on

 other c elestial

 bodies.

 Ho we v er ,

 the

 Out er Spac e

 T reaty does

 not

 prohibit

 c onv entionally

 armed spac e-t o-spac e

 w eapons

 in

 Ear th

 orbit , in

 deep

 spac e,

 or in

 orbit

 around

 other c elestial

 bodies

 nor does

 it

 prohibit c onv entionally

 armed spac e-t o-Ear th

 weapons.

 More o v er ,

 it

 does

 not

 prohibit any

 Ear th-to-spac e

 weapons.

 Fur ther insight

 int o what

 other nations

 c onsider

 to be

 spac e

 w eapons

 can

 be gleaned

 from the

 ongoing

 debate

 o v er the

 R ussian

 and

 Chinese

 proposed

 treaty entitled

 “P re v ention

 o f

 the

 Plac ement

 o f

 W eapons

 in

 Out er Spac e,

 the

 Threat

 or Use

 o f

 Forc e

 against

 Out er Spac e

 Obje cts , ”

 otherwise

 known

 as

 the

 PPW T .

 China and

 R ussia

 jointly

 submitt ed

 their

 draf t PPWT

 proposal

 at

 the

 Unit ed

 Nations

 in 2008.

 The

 proposed

 treaty defined

 spac e

 w eapons

 some what

 narro wly

 to only apply

 to spac e-t o-spac e

 and

 spac e-t o-Ear th

 w eapons, both

 kinetic

 and

 non- kinetic.

 It

 w ould

 not

 prohibit

 Ear th-to-spac e

 kinetic

 w eapons

 or Ear th-to-spac e non-kinetic

 f orms

 o f

 attack, which

 China

 and

 R ussia

 both

 possess.

 In

 De c ember 2008,

 the

 Council

 o f

 the

 European

 Union

 appro v ed

 its

 draf t C ode o f

 C onduct

 f or outer spac e

 activities.

 Among

 its

 many

 pro visions,

 it

 called

 f or stat es

 to “ refrain

 from intentional

 destruction

 o f

 any

 on-orbit

 spac e

 obje ct , ” which

 w ould

 limit

 Ear th-to-spac e

 and

 spac e-t o-spac e

 kinetic

 weapons.

 By f ocusing

 on

 a

 narro w

 set

 o f

 pot ential

 spac e

 w eapons

 that

 hav e

 the

 pot ential to produce

 spac e

 debris, the

 C ode

 o f

 C onduct

 was

 fairly

 limit ed

 in

 sc ope.

 In

 2014,

 the

 European

 Union

 published

 a

 fifth

 re vision

 o f

 the

 C ode

 o f

 C onduct

 that alt ered the

 limitation

 on

 Ear th-to-spac e

 and

 spac e-t o-spac e

 kinetic

 w eapons

 to include

 an

 e x c eption

 f or when

 the

 destruction

 o f

 a

 spac e

 obje ct

 may

 be justified.

 The

 allo wable

 justifications

 are f or saf ety

 (par ticularly

 if

 human

 lif e

 is inv olv ed),

 the

 pre v ention

 o f

 ne w

 spac e

 debris, and

 self-def ense. R ussia

 and

 China

 also

 issued

 an

 updated

 draf t o f

 the

 PPWT

 in

 2014

 that

 alt ered the

 defined

 t erms

 in

 the

 treaty in

 se v eral

 ways. It

 modified

 the

 proposed definition

 o f

 a

 spac e

 weapon

 to apply

 to any

 outer spac e

 obje ct

 and

 included additional

 clarification

 on

 the

 prot e ction

 o f

 a

 stat e ’ s

 right

 o f

 self-def ense

 to include

 the

 right

 o f

 c olle ctiv e

 self-def ense, which

 hues

 more closely

 to the w ording

 in

 the

 EU

 C ode

 o f

 C onduct .

 Ultimat ely ,

 both

 the

 EU

 C ode

 o f

 C onduct

 and

 the

 PPWT

 failed

 to gain

 c onsensus. Ho we v er ,

 in

 De c ember 2015,

 the

 UN

 General

 Assembly

 passed

 a

 resolution

 that urged

 the

 c ommencement

 o f

 ne gotiations

 on

 the

 Chinese-R ussian

 PPWT

 and enc ouraged

 stat es

 to uphold

 a

 “ political

 c ommitment

 not

 to be

 the

 first to plac e w eapons

 in

 outer spac e . ”

 The

 resolution

 spe cifically

 cit ed

 Argentina,

 Armenia, Belarus,

 Brazil,

 C uba,

 Indonesia,

 K azakhstan,

 K yrgy zstan,

 R ussia,

 Sri

 L anka, T ajikistan,

 and

 V ene zuela

 as

 having

 already

 stat ed

 that

 they

 w ould

 not

 be

 the first to plac e

 w eapons

 in

 outer spac e.

 More o v er ,

 R ussia

 and

 V ene zuela

 issued

 a

 joint

 stat ement

 to the

 UN

 C onf erence

 on

 Disarmament

 saying

 that

 they

 “will not

 be

 the

 first to deplo y

 any

 type

 o f

 weapon

 in

 outer spac e

 and

 will

 do

 their utmost

 to pre v ent

 outer spac e

 from being

 turned int o a

 theatre f or military c onfrontation

 and

 to ensure

 se curity

 in

 outer spac e

 activities . ”

 Such

 stat ements imply

 that

 these

 nations

 believ e

 w eapons

 hav e

 not

 already

 be en

 plac ed

 in spac e.

 Given

 the

 diff erent types

 o f

 spac e

 w eapons

 that

 hav e

 already

 be en

 t est ed or demonstrat ed,

 these

 stat ements

 may

 simply

 be

 duplicit ous

 or may

 indicat e that

 these

 nations

 hav e

 a

 narro w er vie w

 o f

 what

 a

 spac e

 weapon

 is.

 C urrent activities

 and

 stat ements

 by

 f oreign

 go v ernments

 and

 non- go v ernmental

 organizations

 also

 shed

 light

 on

 how

 vie ws

 on

 spac e

 w eapons are e v olving.

 T w o non-gov ernmental

 groups

 are currently

 de v eloping

 repor ts on

 the

 military

 uses

 o f

 spac e

 and

 what

 c onstitut es

 an

 act

 o f

 war or aggression in

 spac e.

 McGill

 Univ ersity’ s

 C ent er f or R esearch

 in

 Air

 and

 Spac e

 L aw

 initiat ed a

 proje ct

 to de v elop

 a

 Manual

 on

 Int ernational

 L aw

 Applicable

 to Military

 Uses o f

 Out er Spac e,

 known

 as

 MIL AMOS,

 with

 the

 obje ctiv e

 to create

 a

 manual

 that “ clarifies

 the

 fundamental

 rules

 applicable

 to military

 uses

 o f

 outer spac e

 by both

 Stat es

 and

 non-Stat e

 act ors

 in

 times

 o f

 peac e

 and

 in

 periods

 o f

 rising

 t ensions . ”

 W ork is

 also

 underway

 on

 a

 similar

 proje ct

 known

 as

 W oomera, which

 is

 a

 c ollaboration

 among

 f our univ ersities:

 the

 Univ ersity

 o f

 Adelaide in

 Australia,

 the

 Univ ersity

 o f

 Ex eter in

 the

 Unit ed

 Kingdom,

 the

 Univ ersity

 o f

 Nebraska

 C olle ge

 o f

 L aw

 in

 the

 Unit ed

 Stat es,

 and

 the

 Univ ersity

 o f

 Ne w

 South W ales

 in

 Australia.

 Lik e

 MIL AMOS,

 W oomera aims

 to create

 a

 manual

 that summarizes

 how

 e xisting

 int ernational

 law

 applies

 to military

 uses

 o f

 spac e.

 Franc e

 has

 be c ome one

 o f

 the

 most

 v ocal

 nations

 on

 the

 ne ed

 to de v elop

 better def enses

 in

 spac e.

 In

 2019,

 it

 issued

 a

 ne w

 Spac e

 Def ense

 Strat e gy

 that

 calls

 f or the

 creation

 o f

 a

 Spac e

 C ommand

 under

 its

 Air

 Forc e

 and

 renaming

 the

 Air Forc e

 to be

 the

 Air

 and

 Spac e

 Forc e.

 In

 some

 o f

 the

 most

 dire ct

 and

 spe cific language

 by

 a

 go v ernment

 o fficial

 from any

 nation

 on

 the

 ne ed

 f or activ e def enses

 in

 spac e,

 the

 French

 def ense

 minist er publicly

 stat ed

 that

 Franc e int ends

 to de v elop

 body guard

 sat ellit es

 and

 high-po w ered lasers

 on

 sat ellit es to prot e ct

 French

 spac e

 assets

 from attack.

 Japan has

 also

 taken

 a

 more proactiv e

 approach

 to spac e

 def ense, largely

 driv en by

 threats

 it

 perc eiv es

 from China ’ s

 spac e

 activities.

 In

 its

 2019

 def ense

 whit e paper ,

 the

 Japanese

 Ministry

 o f

 Def ense

 discusses

 various

 means

 o f

 impro ving spac e

 c ontrol, such

 as

 bolst ering

 its

 spac e

 situational

 awareness

 capabilities and

 passiv e

 defenses.

 Japan is

 also

 creating

 a

 Spac e

 Domain

 Mission

 Unit within

 the

 Air

 Self-Def ense

 Forc e.

 An

 unnamed

 senior

 ministry

 o f

 def ense o fficial

 was

 quot ed

 in

 the

 press

 saying

 that

 Japan was

 de ciding

 on

 whether

 or not

 to de v elop

 ...

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