下面是小编为大家整理的2021年于中国进行经济对话重点（2022年）,供大家参考。
MEMORANDUM
ON
PRIORITIES
FOR
20 21
EC ONOMIC
T ALKS WITH
CHINA
T o:
T he
Chair
of
the
US
Delega tion
for
Bila teral
E c onomic
T alks
with
China Fr om:
Nicholas
R.
Lar dy
Oct ober
2020
B ack gr ound:
Economic
negotiations
with China
mus t
be
a
component
of
a
consistent o v er all
s tr ategy
to
pr omote
U S
inter ests ,
rather
than
one
element
of
a
menu
of
mutually inconsistent
and
constantly
changing
initiatives .
The foundation
of
this
s tr ategy
should
be a
comprehensive
progr am
of
U S
economic
r enew al
that
maintains
American
technological leadership ,
rather
than
a
defensive
s tr ategy
that
seeks
to
slo w
China’ s
technological
and economic
rise .
This s tr ategy
of
addressing
pr oblems
at
home
mus t
include
the
r ebuilding of
crumbling
infr as tructure ,
re v ersing
recent
cuts
in
feder al
support
for
r esear ch and de v elopment
(R&D ),
and
a
smarter
immigration
policy
that
brings
to
the
U nited
States talented
science
and
technology
specialis ts
who will s tr engthen
the
U S
econom y .
The o v er all
s tr ategy
mus t
r ecognize that
r egime
change
fr om
the
Chinese
Communis t P arty ,
a
crisis
of
the
Chinese
econom y ,
or
e v en
a
sharp
decline
it
its
gr o wth trajectory
ar e
all unlik ely o v er
the
time
horizon
of
this
adminis tr ation.
The incoming
adminis tr ation
should assume
that
China’ s
econom y
and
its
influence
on
the
o v er all
w orld
econom y
will continue to
e xpand.
Neither
a
gener al
decoupling
fr om
China
nor
the
pr omotion
of
r egime
change
should
be
an element
of
this
o v er all
s tr ategy .
PRIORITY
1:
Be
selectiv e
with
r equests
R ecognize that
economic
negotiations
with China
ar e
lik ely to
continue
to
gener ate
only modes t
r esults
if
the
U nited
States
makes
simultaneous
demands
for
far -reaching
changes
in
multiple
Chinese
economic
policies .
Better
to
start
with w ell formulated
r equests
on
one or
tw o
high
priority
areas
wher e
there
is
at
leas t
a
modicum
of
potential
Chinese
receptivity . R ecently ,
for
e x ample ,
the
authorities
in
China
ha v e
themselv es
emphasized
that
mos t
state- o wned enterprises
should
be
incr easingly
e v aluated
on
their
economic
r eturns .
This opens the
door
to
potentially
productive
negotiations
leading
to
a
curtailment
of
subsidies
to
state- o wned companies .
A cor ollary
of
this
appr oach
is
that
the
U S
delegation
should
be
relativ ely small:
N ot
e v ery go v ernment
department
and
agency
needs
to
be
repr esented.
Nicholas
R.
Lar dy
is
the Anthon y
M.
Solomon Senior
F ellow
a t
the P et erson
Institut e
f or Int erna tional
E c onomics and
an
e xpert
on
the Chinese
ec onom y .
His
mos t r ec ent book s
ar e
T he
S ta t e S trik es
B ack:
T he
End
o f E c onomic
Ref orm in
China ? (20 19)
and
Mark ets
o v er Mao: T he
Rise
o f
Priv a t e Busines s in
China
(20 14).
1750 Massachusetts Avenue,
NW
|
Washington,
DC
20036-1903
USA
|
+1.202.328.9000
|
www.piie.com
MEMORANDUM
ON PRIORITIES
FOR
20 21
EC ONOMIC
T ALKS
WITH
CHINA
3
ii. China’ s
shar e
of
global
tr ade
is
rising
e v en
mor e
s tr ongly
in
2020 ,
y ear
to
date , while the
U S
shar e
is
collapsing .
c. China
has
substantially
liber alized access
b y
for eign
firms
to
its
immense
domes tic financial
mark et
and
is
no w
an
incr easingly
important
destination
for
for eign portfolio
in v estment.
i. Chinese
r egulators
ha v e
allo w ed
multiple
securities ,
asset
management, insur ance ,
and
other
financial
firms
fr om
the
U nited
States ,
Europe ,
and
J apan to
con v ert
e xis ting
minority
positions
in
joint
v entures
with Chinese
partners
to
majority
for eign-o wned firms
and
ha v e
licensed
a
number
of
new wholly for eign- o wned financial
firms .
ii. U S
in v estors
no w
hold
w ell o v er
$1
trillion
in
Chinese
bonds
and
equities ,
up fr om
$ 240
billion
in
200 7 .
PRIORITY
5:
A void
a
policy
of
“ dec oupling”
R ecognize that
the
implication
of
the
abo v e
is
that
a
U S -led
gener al
decoupling
fr om
China is
lik ely to
be
a
high-cos t,
lo w -benefit
policy
for
the
U nited
States
and
a
nons tarter
for
its allies
and
partners .
a. Other
countries
ha v e
sho wn little
inter es t
in
participating
in
a
U S -led
decoupling s tr ategy ,
giv en
China’ s
gr o wing global
economic
and
financial
role .
Their appetite
for
joining
a
U S -led
effort
to
pr omote
r egime
change
in
China
is
e v en
less .
China accounted
for
30
percent
of
global
economic
e xpansion
in
2019 ,
and
its
shar e
in
2020 will almos t
certainly
be
lar ger .
Thus ,
a
U S
decoupling
s tr ategy
w ould
be
a
policy
of
economic
self -isolation
fr om
a
major
sour ce of
global
gr o wth and
tr ade .
N on-US
firms w ould
quickly
fill the
v oid
left
b y
a
unilateral
U S
decoupling ,
gaining
a
lar ger
and lar ger
shar e
of
China’ s
imports ,
currently
running
at
$ 2
trillion
annually .
b. A unilateral
U S
decoupling
w ould
impose
huge
cos ts
on
U S
households
and businesses
that
ha v e
benefited
fr om
the
a v ailability
of
lo w er - cost
goods
fr om
China.
c. E v en
a
narro w er
U S
decoupling
in
technology
is
lik ely to
be
a
high-cost
s tr ategy
for the
U nited
States .
i. Shutting
U S
semiconductor
companies
out
of
the
China
market,
as
the
U nited States
no w
seems
to
be
doing ,
for
e x ample ,
w ould
reduce
their
re v enue
sharply , causing
capital
expenditur es
b y
these
firms
to
fall
b y
$13
billion
and
leading
to the
loss
of
124 , 000
U S
jobs .
ii. M ore
importantly ,
declining
re v enue
w ould
lead
to
deep
cuts
in
R&D expenditur es
b y
U S
semiconductor
firms ,
meaning
the
U nited
States
could
lose its
long-standing
global
leadership
position
in
an
indus try
that
is
crucial
for
U S economic
competitiv eness
and
national
security .
ACTIONABLE
T O-DO
LIS T :
• Cr aft
a
coher ent
China
policy
to
pr omote
U S
inter ests .
• A dopt
and
w ork
to w ard
obtainable
goals .
These w ould
not
include
slo wing China’ s economic
rise
or
pr omoting
r egime
change .
• Coor dinate
with allies
that
shar e
concerns
on
Chinese
tr ade
and
in v estment
practices , including
state
subsidies
and
protection
of
intellectual
property .
• Focus
economic
negotiations
on
one
or
tw o
high
priority
topics
wher e
there
is
at
leas t some
indication
of
Chinese
receptivity .
Av oid
an
omnibus
appr oach
that
includes demands
for
far -reaching
changes
in
multiple
Chinese
policies .
• Av oid
w eaponizing
tr ade
policy ,
for
e x ample
thr ough
tariffs
on
Chinese
imports ,
since the
cos ts
to
the
U nited
States
will lik ely e x ceed
anticipated
benefits .
推荐访问:2021年于中国进行经济对话重点 对话 重点 经济