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w ith the Taliban. A
ne w
que s tion in 2019 gauge s
Afghan s upport for effor ts
to negotiate peace w ith the Taliban. Thi s
year, the proportion of people w ho strongly or s ome w hat s upport the s e effor ts
s tand s
at 88.7%. The number of Afghans
w ho s ay that a group pos e s
a threat to the s ecurity of their local area (36.4%) is alm os t identical to 2018 (35.8%). In an open-ended follo w-up as king w hich group pos e s
a threat, the Taliban continue to be the top re sponse, at 68.9%. The Taliban are s een a s
more of a threat in rural area s
(75.9%) than urban (37.2%) …The number of re s pondent s
w ho cite D ae s h/I SIS
a s
a local s ecurity threat ha s
decrea s ed by 4 percentage point s , to 12.4%, w hich reflec ts
the dimin is hed capabilitie s
of that group. It als o found that A fgha ns
did not w ant peace at any price. The S urvey found that, 3 The majority of Afghans
s ay they w ould not vote for a pre s ident w ho accepted a peace agreement w ith the Taliban, which jeopardize women‘s education (65.6%), women‘s ability to work outside the home (65.0%), or if the central government l os t territory (65.8%). M uch of the world, and certainly mos t A merica ns , w ant that peace for A fghani s tan a s
w ell. That doe s
not, however, mean that t hos e w ho w ant peace are going to get it. It i s
one thing to dream of the peace you w ant, and quite another to have to live w ith the reality you can actually obtain. Key C hal l enges
to Peace Thi s
anal ys i s
examine s
the political, governance, s ecurity, and economic fact ors
that s hape the prospect s
for s uch a real peace. It fi nds
s ome rea sons
for hope, but more problem s
than s oluti ons . It al s o fi nds
that there i s
a s eri ous
ri s k that the U.S . may leave w ithout having created a peace that can offer la s ting s tability and s ecurity. The peace agreement s
to date do more to expedite a U.S . and A llied w ithdra w al than they do to create the conditi ons
that can lead to a la s ting and s ecure peace. It fi nds
that the Taliban remai ns committed to it s
ideology. A nd, that the Taliban ha s
good rea s on s
to negotiate, but t hos e rea sons are more for achieving their ulterior motive s
through negotiati ons , rather than s eeking a real peace. It s
ongoing military progre ss , it s
ri s ing hope s
for a U.S . w ithdra w al, and it s
commitment to it s ideology are all key indicator s . A
w ide range of s ource s
– including t w o major sources
of official U.S . reporting on A fghani s tan –
indicate
that
the
leade rs
of
the
A fghan
central
government,
Pres ident
G hani
and
A bdullah A bdullah, are both a major threat to the ability to create a la s ting peace and a s tate than can meet the nee ds
and hope s
of the A fghan people. More broadly, s ource s
like the World Bank, IMF , and different report s
from t w o U.S . i ns pector general s
provide data that indicate that the porti ons
of A fghani s tan under the central government‘s control are a ―failed state‖ by any s tandard. S ecurity
remai ns
a
critical
i ss ue,
and
one
that
s eri ous ly
threate ns
the
ability
to
negotiate
and enforce a real peace. There are subs tantial official
s ource s
that show
that A fghani s tan w a s
not w inning agai ns t the Taliban before the peace agreement s , even w ith the ma ss ive U.S . combat air and intelligence s upport alongside the exte ns ive s upport from A llied force s
and cadre s
of U.S . s pecial force s , elite unit s , train and a ss i s t force s , and intelligence operat ors . The A fghan N ational D efe ns e and S ecurity Forces
(ANDSF) are making progress , but reporting by the t w o U.S . i ns pector general s
– the S pecial In s pector G eneral for A fghan Rec ons truction (SIGAR) and the Lead Ins pector G eneral (LI G) – s ho w
that the ground force s
are yea rs
a w ay from being able to s tand on their ow n w ith any confidence and al s o that there are no current pla ns
to create an A fghan A ir Force (AAF) that could provide the level of combat capability the U.S . and it s
A llie s
have provided s ince 2013.
The civil development of the country pos e s
equally pre ss ing challenge s
to any effort to create a s ecure and s table peace. A fghani s tan ha s
s teadily fallen behind the pace of development compared to other poor regional s tate s . It ha s
regre ss ed in many w a ys
s ince the A fghan monarchy began to colla ps e in a mix of internal power s truggle s
in the 1970s. It continued to do s o during the peri ods from 1972 to 1989, in s pite of a ma ss ive S oviet effort; under the Taliban before 2001; and after a ma ss ive U.S . and international aid effort s ince 2001. A fghan electi ons
have not produced either a w orking political sys tem or effective governance in the area s
controlled by the central government. Afghanis tan ha s
al s o not moved t ow a rds
effective economic development, and the current economy doe s
not adequately meet the ba s ic nee ds
of it s people. Rather, the A fghan economy can only function if it i s
s upported indefinitely by ma ss ive out s ide aid, and it s till remain s
heavily dependent on the country being the world‘s major source of opiate s . It is
hardly surpris ing, therefore, that the current peace effort s
in A fghani s tan are uncertain at be s t. S o
far,
the
peace
agreement s
s imply
layout
a
p oss ible
s chedule
for
negotiati ons
and
U.S . w ithdra w al s , rather than define a real peace. It i s
far from clear that the A fghan central government and the Taliban can reach a s table, w orkable peace agreement. The A fghan government ha s
critical military
w eakne ss e s
and
civil
fla ws ,
creating
s eri ous
que s ti ons
a s
to
w hether
it
can
lay
the groundwork for s ome compromi s e w ith the Taliban or s urvive on it s
ow n. Mos t of the s e A fghan problem s
are the fault of A fghan politicia ns
and leade rs , and it is unclear that Afghanistan‘s politics and governance can improve to the point w here the central government either w in s
a peace or w in s a w ar. Moreover, it is
unclear that the U nited S tate s
w ill continue to s upport the A fghan government if a peace
s ettlement
fail s .
The
U.S .
i s
already
cutting
it s
force s
and
ha s
not
made
any
public commitment s
to enforce a peace or s tay if the negotiati ons
fail.
Furthermore, U.S . s trategy ha s changed
to
foc us
on
competition
w ith
China
and
Russ ia,
the
U nited
States
faces
major
ne w res ource c ons traint s
beca us e of the Coronavi rus
cri s i s , and A fghani s tan i s
no longer a main center of terrori s t threat s
to the U nited S tate s . Stru ct ure
of t he
A nalys i s
The anal ys i s
begi ns
by examining the challenge s
the U nited States faces
in leaving A fghani s tan and the ne w
pre ssures
the Coronavi rus
cri s i s
ha s
put on U.S . s pending – a cri s i s
that could affect both the negotiati ons
and U.S . w illingne ss
to remain in A fghani s tan if the peace proce ss
falte rs
or fail s . It de s cribe s
both the cut s
the U nited S tate s
i s
already making in A fghan force s
and the impact of pha s ing out all U.S . force s
in time to meet the 14-month deadline s et in the peace agreement s . The anal ys i s
then addre ss e s
the ri s k of the current peace effort s
devolving into an exte ns ion of w ar by other mea ns , the challenge s
pos ed by
A fghani s tan‘s internal w eakne ss e s , and
the effort s
to create effective A fghan s ecurity force s
that can s tand on their ow n. It shows
that both the A fghan central government and the Taliban pos e s eri ous
problem s . Thi s
i s
made clear in the next three s ecti ons
of
the
anal ys i s ,
w hich
addre ss
the
critical
problem s
in
A fghan
governance,
in
the development of Afghan national s ecurity force s , and in the A fghan economy – s ummarizing the key quantitative data in each area. F inally,
the
a ss e ss ment
conclude s
w ith
a
brief
anal ys i s
of
w hether
the
U nited
S tate s
s hould w ithdra w
from A fghani s tan if the A fghan central government continue s
to be a failed s tate or if the current peace agreement brea ks
down beca us e of all the failure s
li s ted above.
Sour ce s
and Me t hods
Thi s
anal ys i s
examine s
each of the s e i ss ue s
in depth, and it make s
exte ns ive us e of other official and non-governmental reporting. It provide s
ma ps , s tati s tic s , trend anal ys e s , and quantitative data to addre ss
both the prospect s
for a real peace a s
w ell a s
the ability to create a s table and s ecure A fghani s tan. It draws
on a w ide range of reporting, including U.S . government, NA T O , World Bank, CIA , UN , and IMF
s ource s , to addre ss
the data now available in order to show
the probability that the current peace agreement can bring a real peace, la s ting s ecurity, and enduring s tability. It pre s ent s
a w ide range of anal ys i s , data, and graphic s
to addre ss
the key problem s
in creating a la s ting peace and the many factors that can ―implode‖ the current peace proce ss . It als o foc us e s
on recent report s
to the U.S . Congre ss
by t w o s ource s
that have exceptional acce ss to U.S . military data and intelligence – the S pecial I ns pector G eneral for A fghan Rec ons truction (SIGAR) and the Lead Ins pector G eneral for O peration Freedom S entinel (LI G). Their reports
had exte ns ive acce ss
to A fghan, NA T O , and U.S . s enior office rs
and official s , w hich are quoted in depth. D etailed C onten t s
The report‘s T able of Content s
foll ows . It s hould be noted that the pace of change in all of the s e area s
covered in thi s
anal ys i s
i s
s o rapid that it ha s
become a w orking document that i s
s teadily updated over time. O ut s ide comment s
and s ugge s tion s
are w elcome and s hould be s ent to A nthony H . Corde s man at acorde s man@gmail.com.
T abl e of Contents
THE UNCERTAIN TERMS OF AN UNCERTAIN PEACE
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